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False recognition in children aged 5, 8, and 11 years was investigated using the 
standard version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure and an 
alternative version in which the DRM stimuli were embedded in stories designed to 
emphasize their overall theme. Relative to the 8- and 11-year-olds, the 5-year-olds 
falsely recognized fewer critical lures when the DRM stimuli were presented in lists, 
but falsely recognized more critical lures when the stimuli were presented in stories. 
Levels of false recognition in the 8- and 11-year-olds were not affected by study 
format. We argue that the story context enhanced the ability of the 5-year-olds to 
make inferences based on the theme of the DRM stimuli. The 5-year-olds then 
showed higher levels of false recognition than the older children owing to their 
inability to reject lure words consistent with the stories.  
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In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure (Deese, 1959; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995), participants are presented with lists of semantic associates of a 
word that is not itself presented. For example, participants hear words such as bed, 
rest, awake, tired, and dream, which are associates of the nonpresented word sleep. In 
subsequent tests of recall or recognition, sleep (the critical lure) is often erroneously 
identified as having been presented in the study list. Roediger and McDermott 
developed an activation-monitoring account of the DRM illusion. According to this 
account, participants spontaneously generate semantic associates of the words 
presented in the study lists. For example, participants who hear bed, rest, awake, etc, 
spontaneously generate the associated word sleep. When later asked to retrieve the 
study lists, the participants are unable to distinguish between the words they heard 
and those they generated in response. 
Although the DRM procedure consistently produces false memories in adults, 
recent research has shown that it is less effective in eliciting false memories in 
children. For example, Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest (2002) found that false recall 
was at near-floor levels in 5- and 7-year-olds, while false recognition was reduced in 
5-year-olds relative to 11-year-olds and young adults. The absence of a DRM effect 
in children is surprising given that they are particularly prone to memory distortion 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1996; Ceci, Crotteau, Smith, & Loftus, 1994) and have 
relatively poor source monitoring skills (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983).  
Brainerd et al. (2002) interpreted their findings in relation to fuzzy trace 
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theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 1996; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, 1998). According to 
FTT, participants in memory experiments create two traces of study items: a gist trace 
that preserves the meaning of an item, and a verbatim trace that includes surface 
details of the item and its encoding context. According to Brainerd et al., the critical 
lures are falsely remembered because of their overlap with the gist traces of the 
studied items. They argued that the DRM procedure is ineffective with children 
because they fail to notice that the words in a list are semantically related and do not 
create the gist traces that are responsible for the DRM effect.  
 In contrast to the findings of Brainerd et al. (2002), Dewhurst and Robinson 
(2004) found that the DRM procedure can elicit false memories in children. However, 
the false memories they observed were qualitatively different from those typically 
produced by adults. Dewhurst and Robinson’s results suggested a developmental shift 
from phonological to semantic false memories. Whereas 11-year-olds falsely recalled 
words that were semantically related to the study items, 5-year-olds falsely recalled 
words that rhymed with the study items. It is therefore not the case that the DRM 
procedure is ineffective with children, but rather that the nature of the false memories 
produced by the DRM procedure changes with age. Nevertheless, the 5-year-olds 
tested by Dewhurst and Robinson still produced relatively few semantic intrusions, 
thereby supporting the proposal by Brainerd et al. (2002) that young children fail to 
create gist memories representing the semantic themes of the lists.   
Despite their relative immunity to the standard DRM illusion, young children 
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have been found to be susceptible to semantically-driven false memories when asked 
to remember more complex linguistic materials, such as sentences and stories (see 
Oakhill & Cain, 2004, for a review). For example, Paris and Carter (1973) found that 
7- and 10-year olds falsely recognized sentences that were consistent with the 
meaning of other sentences previously read out to them, and Brown, Smiley, Day, 
Townsend, and Lawton (1977) found that children aged 8 years and older falsely 
recognized lure sentences that were congruent with a previously heard story.  
Findings such as these show that children make inferences and associations that are 
consistent with the overall meaning of a passage of text. If this is the case, it should 
be possible to increase young children’s susceptibility to the DRM illusion by 
presenting the DRM stimuli in the context of a story that highlights their overall 
theme.  
In order to investigate this, we created a series of short stories based on 8 
DRM lists and presented them to 5-, 8-, and 11-year-olds. Our sample therefore 
included children younger than those tested by Paris and Carter (1973) and Brown et 
al. (1977), allowing us to investigate developmental changes in susceptibility to story-
based memory illusions. The broader age range also allowed comparison with 
previous DRM studies, which included 5-year-olds. Half the children in each age 
group heard the stories and were given tests of recognition memory for the DRM 
stimuli (including the critical lures) after each story. The remaining participants heard 
the DRM stimuli in the standard list format and were similarly tested for recognition 
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memory after each list.  
Brainerd et al. (2002) found that the false recognition of critical lures was 
lower in 5-year-olds than in 11-year-olds and young adults. In contrast, Ghetti, Qin, 
and Goodman (2002) found that false recognition was not influenced by age. 
However, they also found that false recall decreased with age, with 5- and 7-year-olds 
falsely recalling more critical lures than adults when overall levels of recall were 
controlled. As noted by Ghetti et al., their use of relatively short study lists (7 items 
rather than the usual 12 or 15) may have reduced the levels of false recall and false 
recognition in adult participants, which were much lower than in Brainerd et al.’s 
study. The longer lists used in the present study enabled us to investigate whether the 
developmental increase in susceptibility to the DRM illusion is found in recognition 
as well as in recall.  
According to FTT, the absence of a DRM effect in 5-year-olds is due to their 
inability to identify the themes of the DRM stimuli when presented in lists. 
Embedding the DRM stimuli in a story that emphasizes their overall theme should 
therefore increase 5-year-olds’s susceptibility to the illusion. Predictions regarding 
the effects of stories on the 8- and 11-year-olds are less clear. However, given that the 
ability to form gist representations increases developmentally, it is possible that the 
story context will have less of an effect on the 8- and 11-year-olds, who are already 
able to connect the gist of the DRM stimuli when they are presented in lists. The 
greater ability of the 8- and 11-year-olds to use verbatim traces to reject critical lures 
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may also restrict any increase in false recognition beyond the levels produced by lists. 
Our prediction therefore was that the story context would lead to a significant 
increase in false recognition for the 5-year-olds, but a smaller increase (or no 
increase) in false recognition for the 8- and 11-year-olds. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty children (31 girls and 29 boys) were recruited from two 
schools in Caernarfon, Wales. There were twenty 5-year-olds, twenty 8-year-olds, 
and twenty 11-year-olds. All were fluent English speakers with no reported language 
difficulties. Ten children in each age group were presented with the standard DRM 
lists and ten were presented with the DRM stimuli in stories.  
Stimuli and Design. Eight DRM lists were selected from Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) and consisted of semantic associates of the following critical 
lures: sleep, smell, doctor, lion, fruit, thief, music, and cold. Each study list contained 
14 associates of the critical lure, presented in descending order of associative 
strength. A fifteenth word that was highly associated to the critical lure was omitted 
from each study list to serve as a second critical lure in the recognition test. Eight 
stories were written, each based on a single DRM list (see Appendix for a sample 
story).  The stories ranged in length from 65 to 104 words and included the 14 DRM 
words presented, as far as possible, in the same order as they appeared in the list 
condition (in the few cases where this was not possible the order of the words in the 
List condition was altered to match the Story condition). Each recognition test 
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consisted of the 14 studied DRM words, the two critical lures, and 5 unrelated words 
taken from other DRM lists not used in the study. A between-groups design was 
employed, with the two factors of Age (5, 8, or 11 years) and Study Format (lists or 
stories).  
Procedure. The children were tested individually by a female experimenter 
(the second author). They were told that the experimenter would read aloud a series 
of words (or stories) and that after each one they would be given a memory test for 
some of the words they heard. In the list condition, the words were read aloud in 
descending order of associative strength at a rate of one every two seconds. After 
each list, the experimenter read aloud a second series of words and asked the 
participants to indicate whether they thought the word had appeared in the list they 
just heard by saying “yes” or “no”. They were told to say yes only if they were certain 
the word had definitely appeared. This procedure was repeated until all eight DRM 
lists had been presented and tested. The procedure for the story condition followed a 
similar schedule. The stories were read aloud by the experimenter and took between 
30 and 40 seconds per story to deliver. Each story was followed by the same 
recognition test as was used in the corresponding list condition.  
Results 
Three scores were calculated for each child: The number of words correctly 
recognized, the number of critical lures falsely recognized, and the number of 
unrelated lures falsely recognized. These scores were analyzed in a series of 3x2 (Age 
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x Study Format) between-groups Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Effect sizes 
measured by partial eta-squared (ηp2) are also given. Table 1 shows the mean 
proportions of hits and false alarms as a function of Age and Study Format.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As expected, correct recognition showed a significant main effect of Age, F 
(2, 54) = 8.37, MSE = 147.95, p < .001, ηp2 =  .24. Table 1 shows that correct 
recognition increased steadily across the three age groups. The main effect of Study 
Format was marginally significant, F (1, 54) = 3.18, MSE = 147.95, p = .08, ηp2 = 
 .06, and showed higher levels of correct recognition for the Story format than for the 
List format. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between Age and 
Study Format, F (2, 54) = 4.35, MSE = 147.95, p < .05, ηp2 =  .14. This was explored 
in a series of post-hoc comparisons (Tukey tests). Comparisons across Study Format 
showed that correct recognition in the 5-year-olds was higher in the Story condition 
than in the List condition, p < .01, but was not reliably affected by Study Format in 
the 8- and 11-year-olds. Comparisons across Age showed that correct recognition was 
greater in the 11-year-olds than the 5-year-olds in the List condition, p < .001, and 
greater in the 11-year-olds than the 8-year-olds in the Story condition, p < .05. No 
other differences were significant.  
Our main focus was on the effects of Age and Study Format on the false 
recognition of critical lures. The main effect of Age was not significant, F < 1. 
However, a significant main effect of Study Format was observed, F (1, 54) = 4.54, 
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MSE = 5.31, p < .05, ηp2 =  .08, with children in the Story condition falsely 
recognizing more critical lures than children in the List condition. This was qualified 
by a significant interaction between Age and Study Format, F (1, 54) = 10.00, MSE = 
5.31, p < .001, ηp2 =  .27. Post-hoc comparisons across Study Format showed that the 
5-year-olds falsely recognized more critical lures in the Story condition than in the 
List condition, p < .001, while Study Format did not reliably affect the 8- or the 11-
year-olds. Post-hoc comparisons across Age showed that, in the List condition, the 
false recognition of critical lures was greater in the 8- and 11-year-olds than in the 5-
year-olds, p < .05. The 8- and 11-year-olds did not differ reliably. In contrast, the 
false recognition of critical lures in the Story condition was greater in the 5-year-olds 
than in the 8- and 11-year-olds, p < .05. Again, the 8- and 11-year-olds were not 
reliably different.  
The false recognition of unrelated lures showed a significant main effect of 
Age, F (2, 54) = 6.01, MSE = 17.14, p < .01, ηp2 =  .18, and decreased as the age of 
the children increased. The main effect of Study Format was not significant, F (1, 54) 
= 1.12, MSE = 17.14, p = .29, ηp2 =  .02. The interaction between Age and Study 
Format bordered on significance, F (2, 54) = 3.13, MSE = 17.14, p = .05, ηp2 =  .10. 
Post-hoc comparisons across Study Format showed that the 5-year-olds falsely 
recognized more unrelated lures in the List than in the Story format, p < .05, whereas 
the 8- and 11-year-olds were not reliably affected by Study Format. Comparisons 
across Age showed that the 5-year-olds falsely recognized more unrelated lures than 
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the 11-year-olds in the List condition, p < .001. No other differences were significant.  
Discussion 
The main finding from the present study is that the susceptibility of 5-year-
olds to the DRM illusion was increased when the DRM stimuli were presented in the 
context of a story. When the DRM stimuli were presented in the standard list format, 
5-year-olds falsely recognized significantly fewer critical lures than either the 8- or 
the 11-year-olds. When the stimuli were presented in stories, the 5-year-olds falsely 
recognized significantly more critical lures than the older age groups. The present 
findings are therefore consistent with the conclusion by Brainerd et al. (2002) that 
young children are not susceptible to the standard DRM illusion because they fail to 
form a gist representation of the list theme. Presenting the DRM stimuli in a context 
that highlights their overall theme increases 5-year-olds’ susceptibility to the illusion.  
This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the false recognition of 
unrelated lures by the 5-year-olds was greater in the list condition than in the story 
condition. According to Brainerd et al. (2002), the inability of young children to 
connect the gist of the DRM stimuli leads then to produce high numbers of intrusions 
that are unrelated to the list theme (see Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004, for similar 
findings). The finding that the 5-year-olds made fewer false alarms to unrelated items 
in the story condition confirms that the story context made it easier for them to 
identify the theme. As a result, they made associations consistent with the overall 
theme of the story rather than the ad hoc associations to individual items that 5-year-
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olds typically make when the DRM stimuli are presented in lists. The finding that the 
5-year-olds in the story condition made fewer false alarms to unrelated lures also 
rules out the possibility that the increase in false recognition of critical lures in the 
story condition was due to a response bias.  
If the story contexts led the 5-year-olds to make inferences based on an 
overall representation of a story,  it is somewhat suprising that the stories did not 
increase false recognition in the 8- and 11-year-olds, as the ability to construct a 
representation of a story has been shown to improve with age (e.g., Ackerman, 1986, 
1988; Barnes, Dennis, & Haefele-Kalvatis, 1996). One explanation that can be ruled 
out is that the null effect of story contexts in the older children is due to the relatively 
small sample sizes. As can be seen in Table 1, both the 8- and the 11-year-olds falsely 
recognized more critical lures in the List condition than in the Story condition. The 
finding that stories did not increase false recognition in the older children may reflect 
a combination of two factors: the greater ability of older children to form gist 
representations of the DRM stimuli in list format, and developmental improvements 
in the ability to use verbatim traces to monitor memory processes at retrieval 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1996; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, 1998).  
The present findings therefore highlight the complex interaction between 
encoding and retrieval processes that determines susceptibility to the DRM illusion. 
Young children are not susceptible to the standard DRM illusion because they fail to 
connect the gist of the words at encoding. Presenting the stimuli in a story context 
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allows children as young as 5 years of age to use higher-level inferences to connect 
the gist. In contrast, 8-and 11-year-olds are able to connect the gist when the DRM 
stimuli are presented in lists (though not necessarily as successfully as adults) and are 
therefore more susceptible to the illusion than 5-year-olds. However, once the gist of 
the DRM stimuli has been identified, 5-year-olds show greater susceptibility to the 
illusion than older children because they are less able to use verbatim traces to reject 
the critical lures at retrieval.  
This explanation can also be couched in terms of the activation-monitoring 
account of the DRM illusion proposed by Roediger and McDermott (1995). In these 
terms, young children lack the semantic knowledge to identify the themes of the 
DRM lists and therefore fail to generate the critical lures. When the themes are made 
salient by the story contexts, 5-year-olds can make the associations that give rise to 
the illusion. They are then more likely than older children to falsely recognize the 
critical lures because of their relatively poor source monitoring skills. Thus, although 
the associative processes that lead to the DRM illusion develop with age, their effect 
is offset by developmental increases in the accuracy of the monitoring processes that 
inhibit false memories.  
To summarize, the present study showed that 5-year-olds are less likely than 
8- and 11-year olds to falsely recognize critical lures in the DRM procedure when the 
stimuli are presented in lists, but more likely than 8- and 11-year olds to falsely 
recognize critical lures when the stimuli are presented in stories. The format in which 
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the DRM words were studied did not reliably influence levels of false recognition in 
the 8- and 11-year-olds. These findings indicate that the DRM procedure can be 
effective with young children when the stimuli are presented in a context that 
emphasizes their overall theme, and suggest that age-related differences in 
susceptibility to the DRM illusion are the result of developmental changes in both the 
representations formed at encoding and the strategies available at retrieval. 
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Table 1. Mean Proportions of Correct Recognition and False Recognition of Critical 
and Unrelated Lures as a Function of Age and Study Format.  
                              
    5-year-olds 8-year-olds 11-year-olds 
Correct recognition 
Lists    .61  .71  .80 
Stories    .76  .69  .81 
Critical lures 
Lists    .50  .69  .66 
Stories    .81  .63  .65 
Unrelated lures 
Lists    .20  .11  .01 
Stories    .08  .10  .05 
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Appendix 
An example of the stories used in this study (based on the “doctor” list taken from 
Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Words presented in the list format are underlined. 
The word “patient” was omitted from the study presentation in order to serve as a 
second critical lure.  
 
The nurse had written a prescription for Sally because she was sick. Her mum, who 
was a lawyer, told Sally she had to take the medicine because it would improve her 
health. She said if Sally did not take it she would have to go to the hospital. Sally 
hated them more than the dentist. Sally saw a physician the last time she was ill. She 
went into his office and he listened to her heart with a stethoscope. She then went to a 
different clinic where she saw a surgeon who gave her the treatment she needed to 
cure her. 
